Charles Morris
A Brief Outline of His Philosophy
with relations to semiotics, pragmatics, and
linguistics
by Eugene Halton (c) 1992
Charles Morris
(1901-1979) was a student of George Herbert Mead at the University of Chicago
and later editor of the widely known collection of Mead's lectures, Mind,
Self, and Society (1934). Morris helped to create "the Viennese
connection" to American philosophy in the 1930s, hoping to clarify
pragmatism by making use of the foundationalist, verification model of truth
promised by the logical empiricism of Rudolph Carnap and others.
Morris is most noted
today for his monograph, Foundations of the Theory of Signs (1938),
which was the first volume of the grand project for the International
Encyclopedia of Unified Science. In this work he proposed his threefold
divisions of a sign as consisting of sign vehicle, designatum,
and interpreter, and of semiotics as consisting of syntactics, semantics, and
pragmatics. This latter distinction became normalized in linguistics. These
divisions were based on a dyadic, positivist reading of Charles Peirce's
triadic semeiotic, an unacknowledged misreading of Peirce's critique of dyadic
views of signs and of foundationalism.
Pragmatics, a basic
field of linguistics today, originally had its roots in Morris's idea of a
division of signs concerned with "the relations of signs to their
interpreters" or users. Practically, this distinction seemed to legitimate
the place of social context for language study, which was a crucial feature of
both John Dewey and Ludwig Wittgenstein's philosophies at that time, as well as
of the work of Sapir, Malinowski, and others. Yet Morris's behaviorism
unsemeiotically assumed that "users" of signs are not also themselves
signs. Similarly, he assumed the logical empiricist "myth of the
given" in viewing objects of signs--designata or denotata--as not
themselves signs, but as "things" to be denoted by semantic
reference. Hence what is called "pragmatics" is not only
theoretically antipragmatic, but also illogical for the same reasons that
Peirce showed in his critiques of immediate, dyadic knowledge. The lack of
theoretical soundness in Morris's concept of "pragmatics," however,
has not to date had an impact on its normalization in linguistics and related
fields which employ the term.
Morris's chief
publications also include the elaboration of his work in semiotics, Signs,
Language, and Behavior (1946) and Signification and Significance
(1964). Other works include Paths of Life: Preface to a World Religion
(1942); The Open Self (1948); Varieties of Human Value (1956);
and The Pragmatic Movement in American Philosophy (1970). For a
comparison of Morris and Peirce, see Chapter Four of my book, Meaning and Modernity (1986).
See also Charles Sanders
Peirce
.
Email
address: ehalton@nd.edu